Los efectos del programa “Grain for Green” de China en migración y remesas by Delang, Claudio O.
The effects of China’s Grain for Green program 
on migration and remittance
Claudio O. Delanga
1
a Hong Kong Baptist University.
Acknowledgements: The work described in this paper was fully supported by a Faculty Research Grant of the 
Faculty of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Baptist University (project No. FRG2/15-16/098). I would like to thank 
Prof. Tian Qian from the Southwest University in Chongqing for facilitating the research. I am grateful to Dr. 
José María García Álvarez-Coque and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Cite as: Delang, C.O. (2018). “The effects of China’s Grain for Green program on migration and remittance”. 
Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales 18(2), 117-132. doi: https://doi.org/10.7201/earn.2018.02.06.
Correspondence author: Claudio O. Delang. Email: cdelang@hkbu.edu.hk.
Received on May 2018. Accepted on December 2018.
ABSTRACT: The Grain for Green (GfG) is the largest reforestation program of the world. It involved 
payments to farmers to convert their marginal farmland. Many farmers decided to migrate. This paper looks 
at some of the household features associated with migration by GfG-participants, and the importance of 
remittances to those who remained behind. Fieldwork for this research was carried out in Pengshui County 
in Chongqing Municipality. Several variables affect migration, including education, land ownership and 
household size. For most households, remittances consist of over 90 percent of all household incomes, but 
the amount remitted tends to level off when it reaches a certain size, regardless of the number of household 
members who migrated.
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Los efectos del programa “Grain for Green” de China en migración y remesas
RESUMEN: El Grain for Green (GfG) es el programa de reforestación más grande del mundo. Impli-
caba pagos a los agricultores para transformar sus tierras marginales en la vegetación original (general-
mente forestal). Muchos agricultores decidieron emigrar. Este documento analiza algunas de las caracte-
rísticas del hogar asociadas con la migración por parte de los participantes de GfG, y la importancia de 
las remesas para quienes se quedaron atrás. El trabajo de campo para esta investigación se llevó a cabo 
en el distrito de Pengshui en el municipio de Chongqing. Varias variables afectan la migración, incluidas 
la educación, la propiedad de la tierra y el tamaño del hogar. Las remesas forman más del 90 por ciento 
de todos los ingresos familiares, pero la cantidad total remitida tiende a estabilizarse cuando alcanza un 
cierto tamaño, independientemente de la cantidad de miembros del hogar que emigraron. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Programa “Grain for Green”, China, emigración, remesas. 
Clasificación JEL/ JEL Classification: J61, Q12, R23.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7201/earn.2018.02.06.
Economía Agraria y Recursos Naturales. ISSN: 1578-0732. e-ISSN: 2174-7350. Vol. 18,2. (2018). pp. 117-132
118  Delang, C.O.
1. Introduction 
In 1997, the Yellow River experienced a particularly severe drought with the 
lower reaches drying up for 267 days, jeopardising industrial, agricultural, and resi-
dential water uses in the northern plains (Xu and Cao, 2002). On the other hand, in 
1998, massive floods along the Yangtze River claimed the lives of over 3,000 people, 
displaced some 18 million people and caused more than RMB 166 billion of damages 
(Lu et al., 2002). Many environmental experts blamed these floods on soil erosion 
and deforestation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow River watersheds 
(World Bank, 2001; Delang, 2017), even though some (e.g., Ferreira and Ghimire, 
2012; Tan-Soo et al., 2014) disagree on the extent to which deforestation contribute 
to floods. 
As the devastating drought of 1997 and flood of 1998 brought deforestation to the 
forefront of public debate, the government responded through six environmental con-
servation and reforestation programs, to conserve the remaining forests and reforest 
the watersheds (Delang and Wang, 2013; Delang, 2016). The largest of these pro-
grams was the Grain for Green (GfG). The GfG is the largest reforestation program 
in the world, involving 124 million people, 32 million households in 1,897 counties 
(in 25 provinces, and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps) (Mao et al., 
2013). Between 1999 and 2008, China reforested a total of 26.87 million ha through 
the GfG, of which 9.27 million ha was former farmland and 15.8 million ha was 
barren hills and wasteland suitable for forests (Wu et al., 2009). Wu et al. (2009) 
reported that the plan was to convert 14.66 million ha of cropland to forest, and cover 
17.33 million ha of barren land with trees during the period from 2001 to 2010. The 
plan was to raise the forest and grass cover of the program’s target area by 5 %, bring 
under control 86.66 million ha of soil and water-eroded area, and establish 103 mil-
lion ha of sand-fixation areas (Delang and Yuan, 2014).
Through the GfG, farmers are paid to convert their sloped or degraded farmland 
to the original vegetation, either trees or grass. Trees could be either economic trees, 
which may generate incomes from the sale of fruits, or ecological trees, from which 
incomes can only be obtained through pruning. Payments were to last for three years 
for grassland, five years for economic tress, and eight years for ecological trees. 
Farmers were paid RMB 105 a year per mu (15 mu = 1 ha) in the Yangtze River 
watershed, and RMB 70 a year per mu in the Yellow River watershed. In 2007, the 
payment was extended for another period, due to fears that the farmers would outroot 
the plants if payments ended. 
The GfG had both ecological and economic objectives. Among the ecological 
objectives were a reduction of landslides, siltation, flooding and droughts. Among 
the economic objectives were farmers’ poverty alleviation: because most of the land 
targeted for reforestation was slope land (with slopes above 25°) or unproductive 
marginal land, most participants were poor. The GfG subsidies directly raised the in-
comes of some of these farmers. In addition, since farmers were compensated for no 
longer farming the land, they were able to engage in other on-farm or off-farm activi-
ties with greater financial returns. Many decided to migrate to urban areas. 
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This paper explores the impact of migration and remittances among rural house-
holds involved in land conversion through the GfG in one county. The analysis 
examines households’ characteristics in a rural area in Chongqing Municipality, 
which was largely depopulated by migration. In the following sections, the extent of 
migration and its relation with the GfG is described firstly. Then the article explores 
i) the characteristics of the households that send migrants, in terms of education, 
amount of farmland, and household size; and ii) the amount remitted by migrants, 
and the relationship between the amount remitted and education and household size. 
This study aims at contributing to the existing literature on the transformations that 
the GfG has had on the villages from which migrants come from. 
2. Grain for Green as a factor of rural migration
Two factors in particular encouraged the migration of farmers in the early 2000s. 
First, farmers who converted some of their land with the GfG were paid a government-
guaranteed income roughly in line with farming incomes for setting aside the land. 
That income removed the financial constraints that may prevent the poorest farmers 
to migrate and take advantage of off-farm opportunities. Second, China experienced 
strong, protracted economic growth of about 10 % a year throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, which generated a great deal of job opportunities for migrant labour. 
The combination of GfG subsidies which facilitated the migration of the farmers 
and strong economic growth offering seemingly unlimited employment opportunities 
led to massive migration to urban areas (Figure 1) and the gradual depopulation of 
the countryside (Yan et al., 2014). Many rural villages have now very few people in 
the age bracket 19-60. It is important to note that rural migration did not start with the 
GfG. Migration to cities had already begun and would have continued regardless of 
the GfG. Indeed, Liang et al. (2012) suggested that the increase in off-farm work may 
simply reflect the long-term trend toward greater reliance on off-farm work by farm 
households, or risk-coping strategies, rather than being a result of the GfG reforms. 
However, the GfG is likely to have accelerated processes that were already under way. 
Indeed, the role of the GfG in the acceleration of this process has been described by 
some researchers. For example, Peng et al. (2007) looked at the situation in Zhangye, 
a prefectural-level administrative area in Gansu Province, and found that the reduc-
tion in cropland caused by GfG-conversion resulted in a sharp increase in surplus 
labour. Most of the surplus labour force either migrated to other regions to work or 
engaged in non-agricultural work locally. Similarly, drawing on household data and 
descriptive statistics, Zhi (2004) shows that implementing the GfG has promoted the 
transfer of rural labor out of the farming sector. Hori and Kojima (2008) also found 
that, after the launch of the GfG program in Yulin district (Shaanxi province), the 
number of migrant workers among GfG program participants increased considerably.
At the same time, assessing the direct impact of the GfG is difficult, because the pro-
gram is likely to have had an impact also among those who have not converted the land. If 
one individual migrated after converting land, his/her friends would also have been more 
likely to migrate, since they could benefit from their friend’s expanded social network.
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FIGURE 1
Size of rural migrant labour 2002–2015 and its growth rate
Source: Su et al. (2018).
3. Migration and remittances
The benefits of migration to the rural areas are multiform. On the one hand, mi-
gration reduces the number of mouth that need to be fed with shrinking farmland. 
This is important in China, as the GfG was introduced in areas with mostly slope 
land, where rather unfertile soil was keeping farmers in relative poverty. On the 
other hand, migrant family members are likely to send remittances to their relatives, 
which is likely to make a considerable contribution to the total income of the rural 
households. Depending on the conditions of the household and the age structure of 
its members, in some cases remittances may be used to support relatives, especially 
children and seniors, while in other cases they may be used by the remaining family 
members to invest in increasing agricultural output. VanWey (2003) found that 
households with smaller landholdings use migration and remittances to supplement 
rural income, while households with larger landholdings use them to overcome the 
absence of credit in the village.
There is evidence that remittances are an important source of income for rural 
households in China, leading to decreasing poverty rates (Rozelle et al., 1999; Taylor 
et al., 2003; Zhu and Luo, 2010). However, there are contradictory findings as to the 
effect of remittances on household income and inequality. For example, Hua (2014) 
found that most of those who migrated from the rural areas tended to be better off, 
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with the result that remittances increased rural inequality in north-western China. On 
the other hand, Zhu and Luo (2010) found the opposite in rural Hubei province, due 
to greater participation in migration by poorer households. Similar results have been 
found outside China. For example, Stark et al. (1986), Adams (1989), Barham and 
Boucher (1998) Adams et al. (2008) found that migrants’ remittances may increase 
income inequality in the receiving region, because relatively richer households tend 
to be the ones receiving remittances. On the other hand, Koechlin and Leon (2007) 
and Bang et al. (2016) found that remittances lead to larger income gains for poorer 
households compared to richer ones, thereby reducing rural income inequality. Tay-
lor and Wyatt (1996) also found that remittances reduce inequality, as they “stimu-
late household farm incomes by relieving credit and risk constraints on household 
farm production” (p. 899). On the other hand, Taylor et al. (1996) and Durand et al. 
(1996) found more all-encompassing benefits of migration and remittances, since the 
poverty-reducing benefits of remittances to household incomes may have multiplier 
effects that also benefit households not receiving remittances. 
Finally, remittances have broader consequences, beyond their effect on inequality. 
As Gray (2009) pointed out, “qualitative studies indicate a large range of potential 
impacts of out-migration and remittances on agriculture, including abandonment of 
labor-intensive practices (Zimmerer, 1993), intensification of commercial agriculture 
(De Haas, 2006)”, the monetization of previously subsistence-focused rural econo-
mies (Hull, 2007), a decline in reciprocal labour arrangements and an increase in the 
wage rate for such work (Chami et al., 2018), a decline in common property manage-
ment, and an increase in the commoditization of land (Cole et al., 2015). 
4. Household survey and sample characteristics
A farm household survey was conducted in Pengshui county in Chongqing 
Municipality in June and July 2016. Chongqing Municipality is a provincial-level 
administrative unit in the centre of China. The author, together with two specially 
trained research assistants administered a questionnaire translated in Chinese to a 
senior person in the household. This questionnaire included demographic, economic, 
social and agricultural-related questions. A total of 81 households, covering 315 peo-
ple, completed the questionnaire.  Households here include all members of the family 
who migrated. It is possible that all members of some households migrated, and those 
are not included in the dataset obtained.
The average size of the household is of 3.89 individuals, with 52 % male, average 
age 35, and 54 children (17 %) in school. All land was converted by the GfG between 
2002 and 2004. All land was converted to ecological forests, which means that no 
incomes could be obtained from the sale of tree products. The average size of the 
land converted was 1.25 mu per household (with the area varying from 0.68 and 9.5 
mu). This is less than most other areas in China. The average amount of farmland still 
available for each household is 3.43 mu (with the area varying from 1.2 and 6.8 mu per 
household). This amount includes the more productive paddy rice land, and the less 
productive slopeland on which corn and vegetables are grown.
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FIGURE 2
Population pyramid: Migration, age and gender in the fieldwork area
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Source: Survey’s results and author’s  calculations.
5. Findings and discussion
5.1. Migration, age and gender
Figure 2 shows the population pyramid of the 315 individuals included in the 
farm household survey, differentiating by migratory status. Figure 2 shows that most 
children remain in the localities, as do most old people. Until the age of 18, out of 
39 young men, 30 (77 %) remain in the locality. Among young women the percentage 
is almost as high: out of 25 young women, 17 (68 %) remain in the locality. From the 
age of 19 to the age of 64, migration is very common, but more so among men. Of 
the 115 men from the age of 19 to 64, only 19 (17 %) remain in the area. On the other 
hand, of the 100 women in the same age category, 26 (26 %) remain in the area. Gen-
der has an impact on migration, with more males migrating, even though China is a 
patrilineal and patrilocal society. Educational differences between males and females 
are minor, and cannot explain the gender difference in terms of migration. Males who 
are no longer in school have an average of 8.64 years of education, while females 
who are no longer in school have an average of 8.03 years of education. From the age 
of 65, virtually all people remain in the rural area. There is a strong desire among re-
tirees to retire in the areas of origin, especially when they come from rural areas. This 
trend is likely to change in the future (Tang and Feng, 2015), since hukou residence 
rules reforms have made it easier for people with a rural hukou to gain urban hukou 
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–with the benefits that come with it– and settle in the urban areas (Brugiavini et al., 
2018). Factors that affected migration are discussed in the following section.
5.2. Factors affecting migration 
During the early 2000s, migration was facilitated by the ease to find employment 
in the rapidly developing industrial sector. However, the ability to migrate and work 
is not solely determined by one’s willingness to migrate and by employment oppor-
tunities. It is also contingent on individuals’ skills and training (Uchida et al., 2009), 
connections and social capital, which may not be available to some people, as well as 
on endowments of household labour and amount of agricultural land. Five issues in 
particular are often considered when discussing the potential for household members 
to migrate. The farm household survey helps determine the importance of each of 
these factors in Pengshui County. 
1) Capital necessary to finance migration. In this paper the wealth of the house-
hold from which migrants come from is not considered because migration 
took off in the early 2000s, and the small differences in wealth in rural 
villages (see below) would make a sufficiently accurate accounting of such 
historic data for statistical analysis a daunting task. However, since the GfG 
provided compensation to all migrants for setting aside their land, it directly 
addressed, at least partially, this potential constraint to migration. 
2) Social capital and a social network outside the locality is very useful to find 
employment (Wan et al., 2018). This issue was outside this paper’s scope, 
since this research only looked at the trends in the locality itself. However, 
as mentioned above, it is likely that the GfG has contributed to expand the 
social network of participants and non-participants alike, since it encouraged 
the migration of participants, who in turn increased the social network of ac-
quainted non-participants.
3) Education is often portrayed as an important factor in migration (Knight and 
Song, 2003). More years of formal education helps finding a (better paid) 
job, and therefore better educated people have a greater incentive to migrate. 
Figure 3 shows the likelihood of migration, that is, the number of people who 
migrated out of the total number of people, according to years of schooling. 
Only people who are no longer studying are included in this figure. In Figure 
3, only people who studied 6, 9 or 12 years are included. A few people 
(11 people in total) studied for a different number of years, and are excluded. 
As Figure 3 shows, more educated people seem to engage more in migra-
tion, and this is valid for both females and males. Almost 88 % of males with 
12 years of education migrated, and 94 % of females with 12 years of educa-
tion migrated. The level of education clearly affects migration. Better educa-
tion involves better employment opportunities.
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4) Household size can be a factor affecting migration (Yan et al., 2014). Larger 
households are more likely to have a surplus of labour, in particular in China, 
where rural households tend to have a similar amount of land. Thus, larger 
households are more likely to have a greater number of people who migrate. 
This is also the case in Pengshui County (Figure 4). This fact is clear up to 
households with 5 members (there are very few households with more than 
5 members), and there is a strong tendency for one household member to 
remain in the village, while the others migrate. One should bear in mind that 
in some cases all members of some households may have migrated, in which 
case the households are not included in this survey.
FIGURE 3
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Source: Survey’s results and author’s  calculations.
The processes observed in China seem to be mostly in line with the existing 
literature. It must be stressed that China presents more socio-economic homogeneity 
than other countries. For example, the large latifundios and inequality in land access 
present in Latin America and elsewhere do not exist in China. One would be tempted 
to say that they were abolished with the Communist revolution in 1949, and that even 
the tumultuous history of land distribution, collectivisation and redistribution during 
the following decades, has prevented the accumulation of land by individual house-
holds. Households own between 1 and 7 mu, with 58 out of 81 households (72 %) 
having between 2.5 and 4 mu.
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FIGURE 4
Relationship between household size and average number 
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Note: The numbers above the bars denote the number of households. 
Source: Survey’s results and author’s  calculations.
5.3. Farmers’ incomes and remittances
The GfG has encouraged the migration of farmers, thereby changing the struc-
ture of the local economy. A number of researchers have attempted to quantify the 
impact, but most of them (e.g. Uchida et al., 2009) have done fieldwork only one 
to three years into the program (even though the analysis may have been published 
later), when the full impact could not yet have been felt. 
Since some of the land has been converted, and most of the adult population in 
working age have migrated, most incomes now come from remittances. Figure 5 
shows that remittances constitute the greatest share of household incomes in the sur-
veyed municipality. On average 88 % of total household incomes come from remit-
tances, and most households obtain over 90 % of their total incomes from remittances 
(partly because incomes from agricultural activities are very low in China). Only a 
very small number of households have no remittances, and they subsist mostly on 
farming and government pensions. These conclusions are similar to those of Hori and 
Kojima (2008), who found that the income from migrant workers accounted for more 
than 70 % of non-agricultural income for households in 2004.
The average amount remitted is RMB 17,000 a year, or RMB 1,400 a month, per 
migrant worker. With a monthly average salary for unskilled worker of at least RMB 
4,500 in most areas in China, the amount transferred seems both plausible and rela-
tively high. Most of those who migrate are in the 19-64 age class, and since most of 
those who remained behind are children in school or elderly, it is likely that in most 
cases remittances are used to support livelihoods, rather than to invest in increasing 
agricultural output.
126  Delang, C.O.
FIGURE 5
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Source: Survey’s results and author’s  calculations.
Figure 6 suggests that the more members of the household migrate, the less each 
member sends on average.  There seems to be financial incentives for household 
members who migrated to encourage other household members to migrate, as this 
will lessen their burden. At the same time, it is understood that the needs for money 
in the rural area are finite. 
The implication of Figure 6 is that the household income from remittances tends 
to level off. This is consistent with Figure 7, which indicates that the total amount 
remitted yearly steadies at about RMB 45,000 to RMB 50,000 a year if two or more 
members migrated. Although there are great variations among households, when two 
or more household members migrate, each member remits a proportionally smaller 
amount. Migrants only send as much as needed by those who remained behind. 
Most households have three to four migrants, so a remittance of RMB 50,000 a year 
corresponds to a monthly RMB 1,050 to 1,400 per migrant. When three or four mi-
grants share the burden of such remittance, it is manageable.
As for the influence of households’ education, there seems to be a slight positive 
relationship between the average years of education of household members and the 
total yearly remittances received by the household (Figure 8). More year of education 
leads to slightly larger total remittances. However, this relationship is weak, and a 
better interpretation of the data is that migrants remit up to a fixed, limited amount, 
rather than a percentage of their income.
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FIGURE 6
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Source: Survey’s results and author’s calculations.
FIGURE 7
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Source: Survey’s results and author’s  calculations.
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FIGURE 8
Relationship between total remittances received by household and average 
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6. Conclusions
This paper has given a snapshot of the conditions in one county in Chongqing 
Municipality among farmers who converted their land with the GfG. In spite of the 
local characteristics of the survey, these preliminary findings indicate some pro-
gram’s impacts related to migration and remittances to Chinese rural areas.
One research limitation in Chinese rural areas is that Chinese rural households 
and their possessions in any one county are rather uniform, and any statistical analy-
sis is bound to have weak significance. Households tend to have a similar amount 
of land, because of the land distribution of 1949 and 1981, and the legal constraints 
towards land acquisition and land consolidation (Wilmsen, 2016). In addition, the 
household sizes was limited by the one child policy (relaxed under some conditions) 
that was instituted in 1979, and was only removed in 2016 (Feng et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, the paper confirmed some processes suggested in the literature. 
For example, larger households and more years of formal education leads to more 
rural-urban migration. The paper also revealed other facts that may be less common 
in other countries. For most surveyed households, remittances made up over 90 % of 
total incomes. However, the total income remitted to households tended to level off at 
about RMB 45,000 to RMB 50,000 a year per household, if households have two or 
more migrants. This supports the hypothesis that the larger the number of migrants, 
the less each migrant will remit. In other words, there are no advantages to those who 
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remained behind to have larger households and more than two migrant members, but 
there are advantages for the migrants if more household members migrate.
The broader policy implications of this paper is that, in spite of the problems re-
lated to rural-urban migration, off-farm employment for migrant rural people is rele-
vant for the sustenance of those who remained behind. Many migrant people work in 
the construction and labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. If these sectors were to 
collapse, and the remittances dried out, there would be considerable difficulties for 
those who remain in the rural areas. In addition, an economic crisis would force some 
migrants to return to the rural areas, and unconverted farmland is clearly insufficient 
to sustain their livelihoods. These considerations put additional pressure on the 
government to prevent the economy to slow down excessively. 
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